Response to the NSIA report on the Viking Sky incident

VIKING SKY: The report delves into various assessments of the sequence of events and the contributing factors that led to the cruise ship Viking Sky suffering an engine breakdown, nearly resulting in running aground. Fortunately, before reaching that critical point, the ship’s engines restarted, and the crew successfully regained control of the situation. Subsequently, the ship was safetly escorted into port in Molde.

"We appreciate the thorough investigation conducted by the NSIA, considering the potential severity of the incident. We acknowledge that there are several findings from the NSIA report on the Viking Sky incident that warrant further investigation and action. However, it is important to emphasise that there are also recommendations and conclusions in the report that we do not endorse,” says Knut Arild Hareide, Director General of Shipping and Navigation.

Blackout caused by insufficient level of oil in lubricating oil tanks

Following the incident in 2019, it was important to the Norwegian Maritime Authority (NMA), in collaboration with the classification society Lloyds, to determine the root cause of the engine failure. This investigation was imperative not only to facilitate the ship's journey to a workshop, but also to evaluate the potential for similar incidents on other vessels. Through this process, it became evident that the ship had sailed with an insufficient level of oil in the lubricating oil tanks, resulting in decreased oil pressure and the subsequent engine failure.

We believe that today's published report is grounded in the findings we made in 2019 in collaboration with Lloyds. However, we respectfully disagree with the NSIA's assertion that the vessel did not comply with SOLAS* regulations.

"It is our firm opinion that the design of the lubrication oil tanks on the Viking Sky complies with the SOLAS requirements. Therefore, we disagree with the conclusion of non-compliance, which serves as the basis for several recommendations from the NSIA. In the NMA’s assessment, the engine failure was caused by an insufficient level of oil in the lubrication oil tanks, revealing deficiencies in both technical and organisational measures intended to detect and mitigate such issues. The NMA promptly initiated direct follow-up measures on the vessel. Additionally, shortly after the incident, we published a safety notice for general awareness,” says Håvard Gåseidnes, Head of Department of Vessels and Seafarers.

As long as the ships have operated with a higher level of oil in the lubrication tanks, there have been no instances of a drop in oil pressure or blackout. This observation is consistent with the evaluation conducted by the classification society Lloyds regarding the incident and the subsequent measures taken.

"At the NMA, we have complete confidence in this assessment. If there were any doubts, we would have detained both this ship and others with similar solutions. We are unwaveringly committed to safety, and this commitment extends to the thorough follow-up of the Viking Sky incident. While the NSIA may hold a different opinion, it does not alter our professional assessment of the issue,” says Hareide.

Assessments regarding “Safe Return to Port”

The NSIA has dedicated parts of their report to discussing provisions related to Safe Return to Port (SRtP). Due to one of four generators being out of order when the ship departed Tromsø, the NSIA argues that the ship did not comply with SRtP provisions. However, while it is a general rule that all onboard equipment should function as expected, the NMA believes that the assessments regarding this issue in this particular case are not applicable. For the Viking Sky, the primary issue was an insufficient level of oil in all four lubricating oil tanks. Even if the fourth generator had operational at the time, a blackout would likely have occurred to the overall oil deficiency.

"Efforts are currently underway to revise the IMO guidelines in this area. Following the incident, the NMA has also reinforced the requirement to report non-compliance with legislation", says Gåseidnes.

Measures following the incident

The NMA underscores the proactive approach taken following the incident, emphasizing that they have not merely awaited the NSIA report. Several measures have been implemented in response.

"We will thoroughly review the NSIA report, as we do with all their reports. However, it's crucial to acknowledge that multiple measures have been put in place in direct response to the incident,” Hareide concludes.

* SOLAS, an abbreviation for the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, is an international convention aiming at promoting the safety of life and property at sea. The Convention was adopted in 1914 and has undergone multiple revisions after that. SOLAS contains regulations on safety requirements for ships, equipment and crew, and it includes provisions related to fire safety, life-saving appliances, navigation, securing cargo, and dangerous goods. SOLAS applies to all ships operating in international waters (this information was generated by AI and reviewed by NMA professionals)

** Safe Return to Port (SRtP) is a requirement specification introduced in 2009 in the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). The requirement was introduced to ensure that ships can safely return to port in the event of an emergency, such as a fire or water intrusion, and that the ship remains stable and secure for evacuation. The requirement defines thresholds and how long the ship should remain safe for evacuation. Additionally, it establishes threshold at which the ship’s crew can return to port without necessitating the evacuation of passengers.